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Resumen
Esta investigación propone una vía para la evaluación del impacto de corto plazo que 
la crisis financiera y económica internacional, transmitida esencialmente a través del 
canal comercial, puede tener sobre un conjunto de ocho economías latinoamericanas. 
Para el efecto se emplea un modelo del sector real, el modelo GTAP, caracterizado 
por ser de alcance global y operar bajo el supuesto de retornos constantes a escala. 
La estrategia de modelación se basa en la implementación de un choque negativo a la 
dotación de capital de las economías de Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea, de forma 
tal que se genere un decrecimiento del PIB similar al pronosticado para 2009 por el 
FMI. Los principales resultados muestran un esperado y generalizado efecto negativo 
sobre el PIB. Sin embargo, su intensidad no necesariamente depende del grado de 
dependencia comercial de las economías con respecto a Estados Unidos y la Unión 
Europea. La composición sectorial del comercio tiene importancia. Otro tanto sucede 
con el comportamiento de los precios internacionales. A pesar de que el impacto de la 
crisis sobre el valor de los flujos comerciales luce relativamente moderado, la caída 
del PIB tiende a ser mayor y no es desdeñable. No obstante, cuando el impacto se 
mide en términos de bienestar resulta ser más bien moderado.
Palabras clave: comercio internacional, la crisis mundial, Colombia, de equilibrio 
general computable.
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Abstract
This research proposes an avenue for assessing the short run impact of the financial 
and economic crisis on a set of eight Latin American economies, as it is transmitted 
along the trade channel. For this a real sector model is used, the multiregion, constant 
returns to scale, computable general equilibrium GTAP model. The modeling strategy 
is based on implementing a negative shock to the capital stock of the US and EU’s 
economies, in such a way that the resulting behavior of the value of GDP is close to 
that forecasted for 2009 by the IMF. The main results show a generalized expected 
negative impact on GDP. However, its extent not necessarily depends on the degree 
of trade dependence of the economies with respect to the US and EU’s economies. 
Trade composition, in terms of the export and import portfolio, matters. The same is 
true as it refers to price changes. Even though the impact on the value of trade flows 
looks relatively moderate, the drop in the value of GDP tends to be larger and is not 
negligible. In spite of this, when the impact is measured in terms of welfare it turns 
out that it could be moderate.
Key words: International trade, Global crisis, Colombia, Computable General Equi-
librium
Resumo
Esta pesquisa propõe uma via para a avaliação do impacto de curto prazo que a crise 
financeira e econômica internacional, transmitida essencialmente a través do canal 
comercial, pode ter sobre um conjunto de oito economias latino-americanas. Com esse 
propósito emprega-se um modelo do setor real, o modelo GTAP, caracterizado por ser 
de alcance global e operar sob a suposição de retornos constantes a escala. A estratégia 
de modelação baseia-se na implantação de um choque negativo à dotação de capital 
das economias dos Estados Unidos e a União Européia, de forma tal que se gere um 
decrescimento do PIB similar ao prognosticado para o 2009 pelo FMI. Os principais 
resultados mostram um esperado e generalizado efeito negativo sobre o PIB. Porém, 
a sua intensidade não necessariamente depende do grau de dependência comercial 
das economias ao respeito dos Estados Unidos e a União Européia. A composição 
setorial do comercio tem importância. Outro tanto acontece com o comportamento 
dos preços internacionais. A pesar de que o impacto da crise sobre o valor dos fluxos 
comerciais aparece como relativamente moderado, a queda do PIB tende a ser maior e 
não é desdenhável. Porém, quando o impacto se mede em termos de bem-estar resulta 
ser bem mais moderado.
Palavras chaves: econômica internacional, crise financeira
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1. Introduction
The current global financial and economic 
crisis put a halt on recent economic growth 
and endangers achievements in poverty reduc-
tion worldwide. World output is expected to 
shrink 1.4 per cent in 2009 (IMF, 2009) and 
start weakly recovering in 2010 (2.5 per cent 
positive growth). The slump will affect the 
most the developed nations (-3.8 per cent) 
while emerging and developing economies 
are expected to attain low but positive growth 
(1.5 per cent). However, Western Hemisphere 
economies are forecasted to lose output (-2.6 
per cent), especially Mexico whose GDP is 
expected to fall by 7.3 per cent. World trade 
volume (goods and services) are expected to 
decrease by 12.2 per cent.
Started as a financial crisis, it quickly 
developed as a real sector crisis affecting first 
the economies of the United States and the 
European Union and then spreading to most 
countries. Economies most closely linked to 
the international financial system will suffer 
the most, as credit becomes scarce. Yet, econo-
mies with looser ties to international finance 
will be negatively affected mainly through four 
types of transmission channels: international 
trade, capital flows and investment, remit-
tances, and international aid.
As the US and the EU dip into reces-
sion, the world economy losses two of the 
main drivers of international trade. A recently 
released report by the OECD (2009), shows 
that G-7 countries trade is decreasing at a fast 
pace. Exports volume fell 13.6 per cent in the 
first quarter of 2009 while imports volume 
decrease by 10.5 per cent (the corresponding 
annualized rates are -22.8 per cent and -16.8). 
The figures in terms of values are equally wor-
risome. Exports value decreased 13.4 per cent 
in the first quarter of 2009, while imports value 
decreased 15.2 per cent (the annualized rates 
are 27.1 and 27.9 per cent, respectively). The 
financial component of the crisis, compounded 
by exchange volatility, has sent international 
capital flows in disarray, while several major 
investment projects have been called off. 
According to the World Bank (2009), the pace 
of remittances decreased sharply starting in the 
third quarter of 2008 as the crisis took root in 
the countries were migrants workers have their 
jobs and their total volume is expected to mark-
edly decrease during 2009. The problem of 
indebtedness and the instability of fiscal policy 
in industrialized countries could negatively 
affect development aide and donor countries’ 
commitments to contribute 0.7 percent of their 
GDP to developing countries.
While it is clear that none of these 
transmission channels operates in isolation, 
it is useful and illustrative for analytical and 
policy reasons to attempt to assess the likely 
impact of the crisis through these channels. 
The objective of this paper is to provide an 
avenue for appraising the short run effects of 
the current crisis as it is transmitted through 
the trade channel, on several Latin American 
economies. A real sector model (a global 
computable general equilibrium model) is 
employed for this end.
The modeling strategy can be broadly 
described as follows. A negative shock is 
applied to the US and EU economies in such 
a way that it yields as a result a decline in the 
value of GDP similar to the one that has been 
forecasted for these economies by the most 
recent estimate issued by the IMF (2009). The RICARDO ARGUELLO C. 
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shrinkage of these economies is transmitted to 
the rest of the world mainly through the trade 
channel. As the different forms of demand 
decline, the economy demands less goods and 
services from both domestic and foreign ori-
gin. Therefore, production decreases lowering 
supply for domestic consumption as well as 
exports. This means that the rest of the world 
will be supplying less goods to these econo-
mies while, possibly, buying less from them.
The main results indicate that the effects 
of the global crisis on the selected Latin 
American economies, as transmitted through 
the trade channel, are expected to be nega-
tive. However, their extent not necessarily 
depends on their degree of trade dependence 
with respect to the US and EU’s economies. 
Trade composition, in terms of the export and 
import portfolio, matters. The same is true as 
it refers to price changes. Even though the 
impact on the value of trade flows (exports and 
imports) looks moderate, the drop in the value 
of GDP tends to be larger and is not negligible. 
In spite of this, when the impact is measured 
in terms of welfare it turns out that it is quite 
moderate (a consequence of lower world and 
domestic prices).
The paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion two provides some background on the 
crisis. Section three states the objective of this 
research and presents the modeling strategy. 
Section four discusses the model structure 
regarding the areas of interest for the objective 
proposed and describes the scenarios simu-
lated. Section five presents and discusses the 
results. Lastly, section six concludes.
2. Background on the Global Eco-
nomic Crisis
The current global financial and economic 
crisis is the most serious threat that the world 
has faced in over half a century. According 
to Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009) world 
industrial production, trade, and stock markets 
are going down faster than in 1929-1930. In its 
July 2009 update of the World Economic Out-
look, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
forecasted 1.4 percent negative growth for the 
global economy during the current year (a 0.1 
percent deterioration over its April update). 
The severity of the crisis is readily appreciated 
if one considers that the corresponding figure 
for the IMF’s January forecast was a positive 
0.5 percent and that global growth recorded 5.1 
percentage points in 2007 and 3.1 percentage 
points in 2008.
The global economy is expected to gradu-
ally return to positive growth in 2010 (the IMF 
forecasts 2.5 percent growth), thanks to numer-
ous monetary and fiscal stimulus programs in 
developed and developing countries. However, 
it is generally agreed that recovery will likely 
be sluggish (IMF, 2009) and that the crisis will 
have a significant impact on poverty reduction 
in spite that developing countries are expected 
to experience lower growth decline (Chen and 
Ravallion, 2009).
It is accepted that the global financial 
and economic crisis originated in the 2006 
mortgage crisis in the United States. That 
crisis was itself seeded by both the United 
States (US) Federal Reserve and inadequate 
practices among financial institutions and 
intermediaries. Its origin can be traced back 
to expansionist monetary policy earlier in the LATIN AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE TRADE CHANNEL
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decade that drove US interest rates to very low 
levels, coupled with risky banking practices 
among financial institutions, leading to what 
has been known as “subprime” mortgages. The 
subsequent process of converting subprime 
debt into complex financial products (including 
asset-backed commercial paper) via securities 
markets, together with liquidity inflows in 
search of attractive investments, international-
ized the bad (subprime) credit.
The mortgage crisis began to unravel in 
2006 when the Fed introduced a sequence of 
major increases to the interest rate.1 Follow-
ing, the “mortgage crisis” spread affecting first 
American financial institutions all across the 
board and then European ones in the second 
quarter of 2007. The global “financial crisis” 
was then born and the subsequent loss of con-
fidence took hold at the global level, giving 
rise to what has been termed the “confidence 
crisis” that hit the real economy in the autumn 
of 2008, transforming the “financial crisis” into 
a global “economic crisis.”
“Financial contagion” across international 
financial markets was the main channel through 
which the crisis transmitted to industrialized 
and emerging economies. Relatively weak inte-
gration into the global financial system seemed 
to shelter most developing countries from the 
effects of the crisis. However, as it has become 
more of a real sector crisis, for most developing 
countries this may be characterized mainly as 
a “trade crisis” (Evennet and Hoekman, 2009). 
Trade is expected to shrink by 10% in 2009, 
1  From 1 percent in June 2004, the Fed’s headline interest rate 
rose to 5.25 percent in June 2006 (The Reserve Federal Board, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm; April 24, 
2009).
the worst decline since the Great Depression. 
According to Freund (2009), in the first quarter 
of 2009 global nominal trade fell by 30% on 
average relative to the same period last year. A 
decrease attributable partly to a massive decline 
in final demand and a shortage of trade credit 
(Baldwin and Evennet, 2009).
Nevertheless, the decline in final demand 
and the trade credit crunch alone do not seem 
to explain neither the sudden collapse of trade 
nor that trade contraction has been rather asym-
metric and that this asymmetry does not seem 
to be correlated with exposure to the crisis. 
This is due to the fact that income (GDP) is a 
net measure (vale added) while trade is a gross 
measure. An increase in GDP, linked to greater 
outsourcing, will lead to a greater increase in 
trade as materials and parts travel along the 
globe back and for before getting to the final 
consumer. In fact, Irwin (2002) and Freund 
(2009) find that the elasticity of real world 
trade to real world income has been increas-
ing from about 2 in the 1960’s to near 3.7 in 
the 2000’s; an increase that may be due to the 
international fragmentation of production (Yi, 
2008) and to vertical foreign direct investment 
(Tanaka, 2009). 
The macroeconomic impacts and the 
distributive effects of the economic crisis in 
developing countries will largely depend on 
the magnitude and length of the recession in 
developed countries, the main transmission 
channels applying in each case, the initial 
conditions in each country, and the macro-
economic policies they implement to respond 
to the crisis. The main transmission channels 
delivering the effects of the crisis from the 
global level to the national economies level are, 
for developing countries, trade, capital flows RICARDO ARGUELLO C. 
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and investment, remittances, and international 
aid. In this research I only focus on the trade 
channel.
External trade experienced a 9.3 percent 
annual growth rate over the first half of the 
2000’s, more than double the 3.8 percent rate 
of growth for global economic production 
(Decaluwe and Flores, 2009). External trade in 
goods and services is an important component 
of developing economies, particularly those 
in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA), and South America 
(SA). This can be appreciated in Table 1 where 
it is also shown that trade dependency (open-
ness) for some developing countries and the 
rest of the world is large.2 As these economies 
have profited from global economic growth, 
they have also increased their exposure and 
vulnerability to external economic shocks.
2  Trade openness is measured as the ratio of external exchange 
(imports and exports) of goods and services and GDP.
Table 1. Trade structure by region (percent)
Taken from Decaluwe and Flores (2009)
The slowdown in global economic growth 
will affect the volumes and prices of traded 
products. The IMF (2009) predicts a 12.2 
percent decline in world trade volume (goods 
and services) for 2009. In the case of imports, 
for advanced economies the figure is -13.6 
per cent, while the corresponding to emerging 
and developing economies is -9.6 percent. In 
the case of exports, the figures are -15 percent 
for advanced economies and -6.5 percent for 
emerging and developing economies.
There is considerable uncertainty as to 
the expected behavior of international prices. 
From June 2008 to December 2008, the IMF’s 
Index of Primary Commodity Prices fell from 
around 220 in nominal terms (about 195 in 
real terms) to slightly below 100 (90 in real 
terms). Without oil, the figures are around 170 
(150 in real terms) and 110 (100 in real terms). LATIN AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE TRADE CHANNEL
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Since then, and up to Jun 2009, commodity 
prices have risen to near 130 (around 117 in 
real terms) including oil and to comparable 
levels not including it. It has been suggested 
that the developing countries more at risk are 
those maintaining close trade relations with the 
industrialized countries in recession and also 
those who are dependent on high income-elas-
ticity products (for example, the tourism sector 
in the Caribbean and many African countries) 
and on exports of products where world prices 
have fallen the most (for example, copper in 
Zambia). Consequently, the impact of the crisis 
on developing countries should be directly 
related to the trade profile – the structure of 
imports and exports – of each country.
According to Decaluwe and Flores 
(2009), countries that export manufactures and 
services can expect a decline in the volume 
of their transactions, whereas exporters of 
primary mineral materials would face a drop 
in international prices. However, there are no 
clear cut rules for anticipating the trade effects 
arising from the crisis. For instance, while SSA 
and MENA may be hurt by deteriorating inter-
national trade in agricultural products and natu-
ral resources, they benefit from falling prices 
for non food manufactured goods and services 
(at a cost to Asia) and for food (to the disad-
vantage of Latin America). Countries with an 
external current account deficit will face strong 
pressures on their exchange and inflation rates. 
Also, terms of trade effects arising from the 
crisis will be important in determining its 
outcome on developing countries.
As follows from above, casual obser-
vation of the effects of the global crisis on 
developing countries pinpoints to several 
factors and stylized facts that help envision 
their size and extent. However, the only way 
to appraise the impact of the crisis is through 
empirical research that allows for estimating 
the likely effects of the several components 
and transmission channels involved. In the 
following, a strategy is proposed for assessing 
the impacts arising from the trade channel and 
its results are discussed.
3. Objective and Modeling Strategy
As follows from the above, the crisis (that 
started as a financial one) has become a real 
sector crisis. While it is true that none of the 
transmission channels briefly depicted oper-
ates in isolation, it is useful and illustrative 
for analytical and policy reasons to attempt to 
assess the likely impact of the crisis through 
these channels. The objective of this paper 
is to provide an approximation to such an 
assessment for the trade channel for several 
Latin American economies, with a short run 
perspective (i.e. to the likely trade impacts 
from the 2009 projected slump of the US and 
EU’s GDP).
A real sector model is employed for this 
end. I make use of the standard GTAP model, a 
static, decreasing returns, multiregion, general 
equilibrium model widely used for trade and 
other global phenomena analysis. The model is 
described in detail in the GTAP web page3. The 
modeling strategy can be broadly described as 
follows. A shock, detailed ahead, is applied to 
the US and EU economies in such a way that it 
yields as a result a decline in the value of GDP 
3  https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/RICARDO ARGUELLO C. 
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similar to the one that has been forecasted for 
these economies by the most recent estimate 
issued by the IMF (2009). The shrinkage of 
these economies is transmitted to the rest of 
the world mainly through the trade channel. 
As the different forms of demand decline, the 
economy demands less goods and services 
from both domestic and foreign origin. There-
fore, production decreases lowering supply 
for domestic consumption as well as exports. 
This means that the rest of the world will be 
supplying less goods to these economies while, 
possibly, buying less from them (due basically 
to lower supply).
Dixon et al (2009) portrait the credit crisis 
as having an effect similar to that of a sales tax. 
In a credit crisis, households and firms that can 
normally obtain credit to conduct transactions 
find out that they no longer have access to it. 
Therefore, a credit crisis inhibits economic 
transactions in much the same way that a sales 
tax would do. Their modeling strategy (with 
a real sector dynamic model) is thus to imple-
ment a “phantom” sales tax on transactions 
in which credit is important (like durables 
purchases by households and firms inputs for 
capital creation) in such a way that economic 
activity is hindered consistently with OECD’s 
forecasts for GDP. Of course, no tax revenue 
is collected by the government and no taxes 
are actually paid for by firms and households 
(all tax revenue is given back to firms and 
households as a lump sum). The tax is just a 
device for lowering purchases of the relevant 
goods and services.
Results obtained by these authors and 
consideration of the actual behavior of the 
US currency and foreign trade, left them with 
the need to conduct a simulation in which 
there is a sharp reduction in investment but no 
real depreciation (and hence no positive and 
strong trade response). This led the authors to 
explore several alternative ways of modeling 
the crisis, among them a contraction in world 
demand for US exports and excess capacity. 
In the first modeling exercise (Dixon et al, 
2009) the authors thought that excess capacity 
was adequately represented by the shift in the 
capital-labor ratio that occurs as a consequence 
of lower labor supply in the face of fixed capi-
tal at the industry level. As it turns out, this 
assumption would lead to high capital returns 
decreases that inevitable generate currency 
depreciation (and a rebound in trade). There-
fore, the authors fix the model to explicitly 
introduce excess capacity by means of sticky 
adjustment of capital rent rates (Dixon and 
Rimmer, 2009).
As I am interested in the short run effects 
of the crisis and make use of a static model, I 
draw on Dixon and Rimmer’s (2009) intuition 
as well as on Clark et al (2008) to model the 
impact of the crisis on the US and EU econo-
mies as a negative shock to the capital endow-
ment of these economies. The procedure is akin 
to having a certain level of excess capacity 
without leading to a decrease in the capital 
rental rate, avoiding an unrealistic effect on 
international trade.
On the other hand, there is need to model 
labor markets (for both skilled and unskilled 
labor) as featuring fixed wages while the num-
ber of workers adjusts to clear the market. This 
way, the main characteristics of the short run 
development of the crisis are captured: excess 
capacity, unemployment, and sticky wages. 
Admittedly, the approach used here lacks the 
detail (and differentiated effects) that the Dixon LATIN AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE TRADE CHANNEL
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et al (2009) approach has. However, as the 
path along which the economy recovers is of 
no importance for our objective, I believe this 
to be an acceptable limitation.
4. Model Structure and Scenarios
Before moving to describe the scenarios that 
are implemented, it is convenient to discuss 
a couple of features of the GTAP model that 
impinge upon the results. There are two ways 
in which the economies embodied in the model 
interact. The first is international trade. The 
second is global savings and investment.
As in most trade models, trade is mod-
eled based on the Armington assumption (i.e. 
traded goods are differentiated by their country 
of origin). This is typically handled by means 
of Constant Elasticity of Demand (CES) 
functions. Therefore, agents source imports 
independently of the price of domestic like 
products. This separability in demand implies 
that each source region has some market power, 
since its product is only imperfectly substituted 
for by products originated in other regions.
According to Zhang (2008), there are two 
well known drawbacks common to Armington 
models. First, they tend to yield larger than 
expected changes in inter-country relative 
prices (i.e. result in relatively large terms of 
trade effects), especially for small countries 
(as their export demand elasticities depend 
mainly on the Armington elasticity in the 
importing country, whereas export demand 
elasticities for large countries are affected 
by market share). Second, they tend to yield 
smaller than expected changes in inter-industry 
relative prices and, therefore, in national output 
(possibly underestimating gains from alloca-
tive efficiency).
The general equilibrium properties of 
an Armington model are controlled through 
the choosing of an “appropriate” Armington 
elasticity value. It has to be set above one to 
avoid “abnormal” behavior in the model, since 
a lower than unity value implies that consumers 
regard country of origin differentiated products 
as gross complements. However, high elastic-
ity values would be inconsistent with products 
of different origin being dissimilar.
Hence, in an Armington model trade 
shifts from one supplier to the other are deter-
mined by the Armington elasticity. This is criti-
cal when a shock implies changes in market 
access conditions. However, in a situation as 
the one we have at hand (where there are no 
such changes) the above mentioned shortcom-
ings of the model seem to be less severe, but 
it is likely that some underestimation of trade 
flows changes takes place.
Regarding savings and investment we 
have the following. Because the global econ-
omy is closed, Walras Law implies that global 
income must equal global expenditure or that 
global savings must equal global investment. 
However, global savings is just the aggregation 
of regional savings and, therefore, it is deter-
mined by them. Being a static model, there 
is no explicit intertemporal optimization and 
regional savings are determined by constrained 
static optimization. Savings is an argument in 
the regional household utility function and 
constrained optimization leads to a demand for 
a homogeneous savings good. As in the case of 
any other good, demand for savings depends on 
the income level of the regional household and 
on the relative price of the savings good.RICARDO ARGUELLO C. 
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The savings good is supplied by a global 
bank. The global bank is just a device for 
aggregating savings from and for allocating 
investment to the regions. The bank sells a 
homogenous savings good to each region and 
buys shares in a portfolio of regional invest-
ment. Once the bank has collected all regional 
savings, there are two possible ways in which 
it allocates investment.
One follows the “fixed regional composi-
tion” criterion. That is, investment is allocated 
to regions in such a way that the regional 
composition of global capital stocks does not 
change. In this case, regional and global net 
investment (regional investment minus depre-
ciation) move together and rates of return will 
differ among regions (while the global rate 
of return will just be a weighted average of 
regional rates of return.
The second is based upon the idea that 
there is a competitive allocation of investment 
across regions and, therefore, expected returns 
are uniform globally. In this case, investment 
depends on the “expected” rate of return and 
this, in turn, inversely on the capital stock. 
Global investment is allocated so that changes 
in the expected rate of return are equalized 
across regions and the global rate of return 
changes by the same percentage.
With the closure I use here, global invest-
ment is savings driven. That is, the global 
bank adjusts global investment to meet any 
change in global savings. However, it should 
be noticed that although there is balancing at 
the global level, this is not necessarily so at 
the regional level since regional economies are 
open. The regional budget constraint implies 
that expenditures must equal income or, sim-
pler, that the difference between savings and 
investment must equal the difference between 
exports and imports.
From the above, it follows that there 
may be implications on changes in trade flows 
arising from the particular way it is assumed 
that the global economy reaches the savings-
investment equilibrium. While the representa-
tion of savings-investment flows in the model 
is not “realistic”, the two alternatives provide 
plausible scenarios and it becomes advisable to 
observe estimated trade impacts arising from 
the crisis under both.
Lastly, it is important to notice that I use 
a general equilibrium closure, allowing for 
full adjustment of the economy. This rule is 
broken in the case of the US and the EU in 
that, as mentioned, labor markets clear through 
employment levels rather than wage levels. 
For regions of interest other than these two4, 
I make consideration of an alternative closure 
that fixes the relative trade balance (i.e. the 
ratio of the current account to GDP). This 
allows, in the case of a competitive allocation 
of investment across regions, to avoid the “free 
lunch” effect that can arise from potentially 
high foreign capital inflows. However, it must 
be noticed that the existence of a global bank 
controls this effect to a large extent.
As follows from these considerations, the 
scenarios that are simulated in this research 
share a common feature: capital endowments 
for the US and the EU are negatively shocked 
in such a way as to attain drops in the value of 
GDP close to forecasted levels. Beyond this, 
the first scenario considers that global invest-
ment is allocated on a competitive basis, the 
4  This feature is enabled for Mexico, Argentina, Brasil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.LATIN AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE TRADE CHANNEL
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second scenario that global investment is allo-
cated following the fixed regional composition 
assumption, and the third scenario considers 
that global savings are allocated on a competi-
tive basis but that the regions of interest (those 
for which we want to assess the extent of the 
trade transmission channel) keep their relative 
trade balance fixed. Table 2 summarizes the 
characteristics of the scenarios.
Table 2. Scenarios Simulated
The model runs on version 7 of the GTAP 
database, which has 2004 as the base year. It 
has 21 regions and 43 sectors. The regional 
disaggregation emphasizes the Western Hemi-
sphere and its main trade partners. The sectoral 
disaggregation keeps agricultural, resource-
based, and manufacturing sectors as detailed 
as the database allows. Appendix 1 summarizes 
both aggregations.
5. Results
5.1 The case of the US and the 
EU-27
As mentioned, the US and EU’s econo-
mies are negatively shocked to reduce their 
capital endowment. The US capital endowment 
is reduced by 4 per cent, while that of the EU 
is reduced by 6.5 per cent. As a result the US’ 
GDP drops by 2.69 per cent and the EU’s by 
4.88 per cent under the base scenario. The cor-
responding IMF’s (2009) forecasts for the two 
economies are -2.6 per cent and -4.8 per cent, 
so the estimates arising from the simulation RICARDO ARGUELLO C. 
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are reasonably close to the expected behavior 
of these economies.
Table 3 shows the main macroeconomic 
effects arising from the simulations. From 
there it can be appreciated that for both coun-
tries there is small variation in GDP changes 
under the three scenarios. In the case of the 
US, exports are the GDP component that is 
the most affected, while imports is the least 
affected. As regards the EU, foreign trade is 
affected the most. Exports show the highest 
percentage change, followed by imports. As 
expected, given the type of shock imple-
mented, changes in all components of GDP are 
commensurate with the total change in GDP 
for both regions.
Table 3. Main Macroeconomic Effects from the Crisis on the US and the EU-27 
(Percentages)
Source: author’s simulations
In spite of changes in exports and imports, 
the regional structure of trade (in terms of 
regional shares) practically does not change 
for neither of the two countries. Tables 4 and 
5 show percentage changes in trade flows for 
the main US trade partners for exports and 
imports under the three scenarios.
Taking into account that US exports 
decrease in between 3.3 per cent and 3.4 per 
cent, depending on the scenario (see Table 3), 
it is clear that trade with the EU decreases more 
than proportionally, as this region also dips 
into the crisis, while US exports to Canada and 
Mexico decrease the least.LATIN AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE TRADE CHANNEL
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Table 4. Percentage Changes in Regional Trade Flows for US Exports
Source: author’s simulations
Table 5. Percentage Changes in Regional Trade Flows for US Imports
Source: author’s simulations
US imports decrease around 2.4 per cent 
under all scenarios. As happens with exports, 
imports from the EU decrease the most and 
proportionally more than exports do. There-
fore, there is more shifting among regions in 
US import flows as imports from regions other 
than the EU decrease moderately, especially in 
the cases of Japan and Canada (see Table 5).
As regards the EU, Table 6 shows percent-
age changes in regional export flows for the 
region. As EU’s exports decrease around 5.6 
per cent (Table 3), intra EU exports and exports 
to the US decrease more than proportionally. 
In this case, EFTA countries are the ones for 
which EU exports decrease the least. It should 
be noticed that trade with China suffers the 
most among regions other than the EU and 
the US.
Table 6. Percentage Changes in Regional Trade Flows for EU Exports
Source: author’s simulationsRICARDO ARGUELLO C. 
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Table 7. Percentage Changes in Regional Trade Flows for EU Imports
Source: author’s simulations
Lastly, Table 7 presents percentage 
changes in regional imports by the EU. EU’s 
imports decrease between 4.8 and 4.9 per cent, 
so it follows from the table that intra EU trade 
and imports from the US make the bulk of the 
adjustment. However, it must be noticed that 
trade with the Rest of the World also bears an 
important adjustment.
In terms of volumes, trade shrinks for 
both regions. Export volumes from the US 
to all regions decrease. Exports to the EU 
contribute in between 40.2 per cent and 41.6 
per cent to trade shrinkage, depending on the 
scenario, while exports to Asia contribute 
from 26.7 per cent to 28.4 per cent. Exports to 
Canada account for around 11.5 per cent of the 
decrease, while exports to Mexico for around 
6.6 per cent. In the case of the EU, the great-
est contributor to export shrinkage is intra-EU 
exports. It accounts for around 70 per cent 
under all scenarios. The second largest is trade 
with the US, which makes up in between 9.3 
and 9.7 per cent of export volume decreases.
Imports volumes decrease as a whole 
for the US. However, not all import flows 
decrease, as there are regions for which figures 
are positive. The most notable cases are those 
of Canada, Mexico, and EFTA under the base 
scenario (although increases are meager in 
general). The situation is similar for the EU. 
Imports from EFTA (under the base scenario 
and the fixed trade balance scenario) and 
China and Japan (under the fixed investment 
scenario) increase modestly while decrease for 
the rest of regions. The EU is the biggest con-
tributor to the decrease in US imports, under all 
scenarios followed by Asia. In the case of the 
EU, intra-EU trade shows the biggest share in 
trade shrinkage (around 88 per cent), followed 
by the US (7.8 per cent as average).
A notable result is the way terms of trade 
play to somehow mitigate the deterioration of 
the two economies (a characteristic associated 
with both being big countries). As shown in 
Table 8, the price index of imports decreases 
relatively sharply in the case of the US, while 
the price index of exports increases. This 
brings, as a result, a noticeable improvement in 
the terms of trade for this economy. Important 
but lower improvements in the terms of trade 
attain for the EU. However, in this case, they 
are mostly due to an important increase in the 
price index of exports (although the price index 
of imports decreases, the decrease is relatively 
modest).LATIN AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE TRADE CHANNEL
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Table 8. Terms of Trade Changes for the US and the EU’s economies
Source: author’s simulations
Lastly, as can be expected from the 
above, in terms of welfare both economies 
loose. The US economy looses welfare in an 
amount equivalent to 2.64 per cent of GDP 
while the EU economy looses 4.61 per cent of 
GDP. As an average, allocative efficiency loses 
contribute 34 per cent of total welfare loses in 
the US and 46.4 per cent in the EU. By far the 
biggest contributor to welfare loses for both 
economies is changes in factor endowments. 
These originate in the capital endowment 
shock through which the crisis is simulated 
here and in changes in the level of employment 
for both unskilled and skilled labor. In the US 
factor changes contribute 70.2 per cent of total 
welfare loses while in the EU they contribute 
57.1 per cent. As mentioned, changes in terms 
of trade make positive contributions to eco-
nomic results for both economies. In the case 
of the US they make a positive contribution 
equivalent to 3.4 per cent of welfare (absolute) 
changes and in the case of the EU a positive 
contribution equivalent to 3.6 per cent. The 
savings/investment position of the economy 
plays a positive role in the case of the US (0.8 
per cent of the welfare change) and a negative 
one in the case of the EU (0.1 per cent).
5.2 The Case of Countries of Interest
For illustrative purposes I consider the cases 
of Mexico, Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. Results attained 
for trade flows are discussed first, then GDP 
changes are presented, and lastly impacts on 
real factor returns and welfare.
Overall, the value of exports is expected 
to decline. As an average exports may decrease 
by 1.1 per cent, Venezuela showing the larg-
est decrease (2 per cent) and Argentina the 
lowest (0.6 per cent). Table 9 shows average 
percentage changes in the value of exports by 
region of origin and destination.5 From there 
it follows that exports to the US and the EU 
should decline, while exports to Asia, the Rest 
of America, and the Rest of the World (mostly) 
increase.
5  The figures correspond to the average over the three scenarios 
considered.RICARDO ARGUELLO C. 
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Table 9. Percentage Changes in Regional Export Flows for Selected Latin American Countries
Source: author’s simulations
On the other side, Table 10 shows average 
percentage changes in the value of imports by 
region.6 In general, imports decline for all Latin 
American countries analyzed, the average 
decrease being 1.5 per cent, the sharpest cor-
responding to Venezuela (2.1 per cent) and the 
6  Again, figures correspond to the average over the three sce-
narios considered.
lowest to Argentina (1 per cent). As expected, 
imports from the US and the EU decline. With 
respect to other regions, imports from the Rest 
of America and the Rest of the World increase 
and imports from Asia tend to increase too.
Table 10. Percentage Changes in Regional Import Flows for Selected Latin American Countries
Source: author’s simulations
Of course, changes in trade values are 
determined by both changes in volumes and 
in prices. For brevity and to illustrate the way 
quantity and price effects play in determining 
changes in trade values, Tables 11 and 12 show 
the behavior of a set of sectors (exportable and 
importable, respectively) for each country of 
interest under the base scenario.LATIN AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE TRADE CHANNEL
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From Table 11 it can be appreciated that 
Venezuela, Ecuador, Mexico, Chile, and Peru, 
are the countries with the highest concentration 
of exports in a few sectors (column “Sectors”). 
Using the base year export shares for each sec-
tor as weights, the column “Fob price” shows 
the percentage change in export prices for 
the selected set of sectors, while the columns 
“Quantity” and “Value” show the correspond-
ing percentage changes in exported volumes 
and the value of exports. For reference, the 
last column (“Total”) shows the estimated 
percentage change for the value of all exports. 
The countries with the highest decreases in 
prices are Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia. 
Regarding quantities, almost all countries of 
interest show modest increases. The exceptions 
to this are Venezuela and Colombia. From 
these data, it follows that the countries with 
the largest decreases in export value for the 
main sectoral exports (Venezuela, Ecuador, 
and Colombia) attain this result due mainly 
to price decreases (with quantity decreases 
pointing in the same direction in two out of 
the three cases).
Table 11. Price and Quantity Percentage Changes for the Main Sectoral Exports in Selected Latin 
American Countries
Source: author’s simulations
Table 12 shows analogous information 
from the import side. As known, imports tend 
to be more diversified than exports, Chile and 
Peru being the countries with the highest rela-
tive diversification. In general, import prices 
decline. The largest decreases are found in the 
cases of Peru and Chile while it is noticeable 
the fact that import prices increase negligibly 
for Mexico. Quantities imported decrease in all 
cases, the largest corresponding to Venezuela, 
Ecuador, Brasil, and Colombia. As a conse-
quence, while export values tend to decrease 
due to price declines, imports tend to decrease 
because of both price and quantity decreases, 
the latter being the most important.RICARDO ARGUELLO C. 
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Table 12. Price and Quantity Percentage Changes for the Main Sectoral Imports in Selected Latin 
American Countries
Source: author’s simulations
The above suggests that terms of trade 
play against this group of economies (contrary 
to what happens with the US and EU’s econo-
mies). In fact, terms of trade deteriorate for all 
economies under consideration. As average 
over the three scenarios considered, terms of 
trade decrease by 0.94 per cent in the case of 
Mexico, 0.86 for Argentina, 0.43 for Brasil, 
0.29 for Chile, 1.68 for Colombia, 1.82 for 
Ecuador, 0.27 for Peru, and 2.84 for Venezuela. 
The relatively large impact of terms of trade 
changes in the cases of Venezuela, Ecuador, 
and Colombia, is due to the fact that several 
of their most important exports are among the 
sectors for which international prices decline 
the most (as oil, coal, other crops, and petro-
leum and coal products).
As the crisis hits demand in the US and 
the EU, international prices tend to fall as their 
trade drops. Lower imports and exports to and 
from these economies, imply some adjustment 
in the patterns of trade, as shown in Tables 
9 and 10. This adjustment occurs as relative 
prices change and the economies move towards 
reestablishing equilibrium (including current 
account equilibrium). Countries exporting to 
the US and the EU products belonging to the 
sectors were imports relatively shrink the most, 
will be harder hit from the export side. The 
same is true from the import side. Countries 
importing products belonging to sectors where 
US and EU’s exports shrink the most, will have 
their trade most affected.
Therefore, it is not only the degree of 
trade dependence with respect to the US and 
EU’s economies what matter for determining 
the size of the impact that arises from the crisis 
and is transmitted through the trade channel. 
From the above it is clear that the structure of 
trade plays an important role. For instance, 
a country with lower trade dependence with 
respect to the two economies from which the 
crisis originates but commercially linked to 
them through the sectors with larger declines, 
could be harder hit than a country with greater 
trade dependency but linked through sectors 
showing lower declines. Furthermore, the 
direction of changes in relative prices does 
matter in determining the size and direction 
of the impacts. As shown above, for the set of 
countries of interest, the effect of export prices 
dominates from the export side while the effect LATIN AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE TRADE CHANNEL
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of volume changes dominates from the import 
side. In fact, in this case terms of trade changes 
play against this set of economies. In particular, 
as the economies try to reestablish equilibrium, 
export prices falling more than import prices 
lead to increases in export volumes so as to 
partly compensate for the lower decline in 
total import value.
This is why a country like Mexico, whose 
joint exports to the US and the EU represent 
roughly 87 per cent of total exports, shows 
lower decreases in total export value than 
countries like Colombia or Ecuador (with joint 
export shares to the US and the EU of about 
59 and 66 per cent, respectively). Of course, 
lower trade dependence with respect to these 
two economies correlates with a trend to lower 
impacts on trade (as the cases of Argentina, 
Brasil, and Chile show –with 34, 49, and 45 
per cent of total exports going to the US and 
the EU.
Trade changes affect output in several 
ways. Decreases in export volumes and 
increases in import volumes clearly lead to 
decreases in the volume of domestic produc-
tion. However, this clear cut case is just one of 
the several possible cases. If export volumes 
increase and import volumes increase, the net 
effect on output volume will depend upon rela-
tive export and import volume changes. On the 
other hand, as relative prices adjust globally 
the valuation of output quantity will change 
accordingly. Furthermore, as relative prices 
change, consumers optimally adjust their 
consumption baskets in response (changing 
also the composition of imported to domesti-
cally produced goods in demand). Therefore, 
output changes are the result of a complex 
mix of effects.
Table 13 shows percentage changes in the 
GDP quantity index, the GDP price index, and 
the value of GDP for the countries under study. 
From there, it can be appreciated that the value 
of GDP for all countries under all scenarios 
considered diminishes. The highest average 
(across countries) decreases are attained under 
the base scenario, followed by the fixed invest-
ment scenario, and lastly by the fixed trade 
balance scenario (1.5, 1.4, and 1.2 per cent, 
respectively). The decomposition of value 
changes among price and quantity changes 
shows that price changes dominate. In effect, 
in all cases the price index decreases and its 
absolute value is higher than the change in the 
quantity index. Although, in general, changes 
in quantity tend to be negative, there are cases 
in which the volume of GDP increases. This 
is so most frequently under the fixed trade 
balance scenario as well as for some countries 
(Chile and Peru in particular).RICARDO ARGUELLO C. 
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Table 13. Percentage Changes in GDP Quantity, Price, and Value Indices for Selected Latin Ameri-
can Countries
Source: author’s simulations
As for any other good in the economy, 
factor returns are affected by the above 
adjustments as demand for them switches 
between sectors and returns equalize across the 
economy (it is worth remembering that here 
it is assumed that this set of countries has full 
factor employment). Then, real factor returns 
provide a glimpse over the distributive effects 
of the crisis as it is transmitted through the 
trade channel. Table 14 shows average (over 
the three scenarios) percentage changes in real 
factor returns for all countries of interest.LATIN AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE TRADE CHANNEL
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Table 14. Percentage Changes in Real Factor Returns for Selected Latin American Countries
Source: author’s simulations
As trade of natural resource-based prod-
ucts (oil, coal, minerals, etc.) is one of the 
most affected, it is no surprise that real factor 
returns to natural resources decline and do it 
in a considerable larger measure than for other 
factors. Land is a factor that is specific for a 
set of sectors (agriculture and livestock) and is 
characterized by its sluggishness in switching 
among uses. Therefore, in the face of declining 
prices and demand its real factor return tends 
to drop. The exceptions to this are Argentina 
and Ecuador, countries where important agri-
cultural sectors experience increases. Results 
for labor (unskilled and skilled) and capital are 
mixed. Returns for skilled labor and capital 
tend to move in tandem while the behavior of 
unskilled labor returns tends to be positive for 
most countries. In general while changes in 
real factor returns to natural resources and land 
are, in general, relatively important, changes 
in factor returns for labor and capital tend to 
be negligible.
The summary measure of the economic 
effects of the crisis (as transmitted through 
the trade channel) on the Latin American 
economies of interest is welfare changes. Table 
15 shows welfare changes (measured as the 
equivalent variation in US$ millions of 2004) 
for the whole set of countries under the three 
scenarios. A shown, welfare decreases in all 
cases but, as a percentage of GDP the losses 
are small. As an average, welfare decreases 
by 0.3 per cent of GDP while the value of 
GDP decreases by 1.4 per cent. As must be 
obvious, the difference basically arises from 
price changes. As world prices tend to fall, 
real income does not fall as much as the value 
of GDP.
From the components of welfare changes, 
it is terms of trade effects the one that drives 
the results. On average, terms of trade effects 
explain around 88 per cent of welfare changes. 
Summarily, the way terms of trade effects 
are calculated is the following. In the case of 
exports, if the difference between the percent-
age change in the fob price and the world price 
for a product is positive, the effect on welfare 
is positive as the price of the good domestically 
produced and exported increases with respect 
to its international price.7 Conversely, if the 
7  It must be recalled that in this model products of the same 
kind (sector) are differentiated by their place of origin and are 
imperfectly substitutable, therefore their prices differ.RICARDO ARGUELLO C. 
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difference between the percentage change 
in the fob price of an imported product (that 
is, its fob price in the country of origin) and 
the world price of the product is positive, the 
effect on welfare is negative as the price of 
the imported product increases with respect 
Table 15. Welfare Changes for Selected Latin American Economies Arising from the Crisis as 
Transmitted through the Trade Channel (Equivalent Variation –US$ millions of 2004)
Source: author’s simulations
to its international price. Also, relative price 
changes for transport services are taken into 
account. Therefore, terms of trade effects stem 
from the relationship between world prices, 
export prices of the country, and import prices 
to the country.
For the countries studied, using the base 
scenario as an illustration, it can be observed 
that for Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, and 
Venezuela both exports and imports contrib-
ute negatively to terms of trade effects. That 
is, for these countries export prices increase 
less than the corresponding world price and 
import prices increase more than the corre-
sponding world prices. In the cases of Brasil, 
Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, exports contribute LATIN AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE TRADE CHANNEL
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5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Given the intrinsic uncertainty on the extent 
of the effect of the crisis on the US and EU’s 
economies, it is convenient to test the above 
results with respect to changes in the expected 
decline in GDP for them. For this, a systematic 
sensitivity analysis was carried out with respect 
to the size of the shock to the capital stock in 
both economies. The shocks were allowed to 
jointly vary by 50 per cent above and below 
the benchmark (as mentioned, 4 per cent in the 
case of the US and 6.5 per cent in the case of 
the EU). With this variation, expected changes 
in GDP for the US and the EU will range in 
between -3.31 and -2.11 per cent for the US 
and -6.01 and -3.72 per cent for the EU, as an 
average across the three scenarios. As can be 
appreciated, this variation must accommo-
date the range of available estimates for the 
expected shrinkage of these economies.
Given the above, confidence intervals 
at the 94 per cent confidence level were built 
for the estimates of changes in GDP, value of 
exports, value of imports, and welfare for the 
Latin American economies of interest. For 
simplicity of presentation, and considering 
that confidence intervals for all scenarios are 
consistent in that they are relatively close in 
value and have no sign switches, Table 16 
presents confidence intervals for the average 
of the three scenarios. Fully detailed tables are 
presented in the appendix.
negatively while imports contribute positively. 
Therefore, for them export prices increase less 
than world prices but import prices decrease 
relative to the relevant world prices. Of course, 
this signals the direction of welfare changes but 
their magnitude depends not only upon relative 
price changes but also on the importance of 
the specific sectors in export and import trade. 
Finally, it is important to mention that in all 
cases the biggest contributor to terms of trade 
originated welfare changes is the deterioration 
in export prices.
As a summary, the effects of the global 
crisis on the selected Latin American econo-
mies, as transmitted through the trade channel, 
are expected to be negative. However, their 
extent not necessarily depends on their degree 
of trade dependence with respect to the US and 
EU’s economies. Trade composition, in terms 
of the export and import portfolio, matters. 
The same is true as it refers to price changes. 
Even though the impact on the value of trade 
flows (exports and imports) looks moderate, 
the drop in the value of GDP is larger and not 
negligible. In spite of this, when the impact is 
measured in terms of welfare it turns out that 
it is quite moderate (a consequence of lower 
world and domestic prices).RICARDO ARGUELLO C. 
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Table 16. Confidence Intervals (94 per cent) for the Main Impacts arising from the Crisis on Latin 
American Economies
Source: author’s simulations
From these data it follows that results 
are robust both from the point of view of 
their magnitudes and signs. Therefore, it can 
be expected that GDP, welfare, the value of 
exports, and the value of imports will decrease 
for all countries considered.
From the point of view of changes in 
GDP, the countries with the lowest negative 
impacts are Brasil, Chile and Peru, while those 
most affected are Venezuela and Ecuador. With 
respect to exports, the least affected countries 
are Argentina, Brasil, and Mexico and the 
most affected are Venezuela and Ecuador. 
Regarding changes in imports, the countries 
less impacted are Argentina, Mexico, and Chile 
and the most impacted are Venezuela, Ecuador, 
and Colombia. Lastly with respect to welfare, 
the countries with the lowest relative impacts 
are Argentina, Mexico, and Chile, while those 
with the highest relative impacts are Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Colombia.
6. Concluding Comments
This research attempts to provide an 
avenue for assessing the short run impact of 
the financial and economic crisis on a set of LATIN AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE TRADE CHANNEL
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Latin American economies, as it is transmit-
ted along and (mostly) only through the trade 
channel. For this a real sector model is used, 
the multiregion, constant returns to scale, com-
putable general equilibrium GTAP model. The 
modeling strategy is based on implementing a 
negative shock to the capital stock of the US 
and EU’s economies, in such a way that the 
resulting behavior of the value of GDP is close 
to that forecasted for 2009 by the IMF. It also 
considers that labor markets in these econo-
mies clear by adjusting the level of employ-
ment, an assumption consistent with a short run 
perspective and observed behavior.
Results for the US and EU’s economies 
indicate that the US economy may shrink in 
between 2.69 and 2.74 per cent and the EU’s 
in between 4.81 and 4.9 per cent. The value of 
exports would decrease around 3.37 and 5.6 
per cent in the US and the EU, respectively, 
while the value of imports would do so by 
around 2.4 per cent in the US and 4.87 per 
cent in the EU.
For the Latin American economies con-
sidered (Mexico, Argentina, Brasil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) the 
value of exports is expected to decline. As an 
average, exports may decrease by 1.1 per cent, 
Venezuela showing the largest decrease (2 per 
cent) and Argentina the lowest (0.6 per cent). 
Similarly, imports decline for all Latin Ameri-
can countries analyzed, the average decrease 
being 1.5 per cent, the sharpest corresponding 
to Venezuela (2.1 per cent) and the lowest to 
Argentina (1 per cent). As expected, exports to 
and imports from the US and the EU decline.
In the case of the US and EU’s econo-
mies, the estimated decline in GDP closely 
matches (by design) that forecasted by the 
IMF (2009). In contrast, the resulting estima-
tion for the decrease in trade is well below 
(the IMF forecasts a 13.6 per cent decline in 
imports volume and a 15 per cent decline in 
exports volume for advanced economies). As 
mentioned in section 2, with the fragmentation 
of international production, frequently accom-
panied by vertical FDI, changes in GDP get 
amplified when reflected on changes in trade. 
Therefore, a decline in GDP, linked to smaller 
outsourcing, will lead to a greater decrease 
in trade as intermediate goods cease to travel 
back and for, at the international level, before 
a good gets to the final consumer. If, as Freund 
(2009) estimates, the growth elasticity of trade 
is near 3.7, a 2.6 per cent decline in US’ GDP 
may lead to a 9.6 per cent decline in trade and 
a 4.8 per cent decrease in EU’s GDP to a 17.8 
per cent decline in trade.
There may be several reasons why a 
model like the one used here do not reflect such 
a big change in trade when GDP is affected 
(leaving aside issues related to parameters, like 
the elasticity of substitution between domestic 
and imported goods). One may be the sectoral 
aggregation used in the model. However, this 
effect is relatively minor as compared to that 
of other factors.
By its own nature, the model cannot 
take into account a whole set of factors that 
may bear heavily on trade changes. Freund 
(2009) lists a series of reasons why trade may 
respond more sharply to GDP during global 
slowdowns than during normal times, which 
are not taken into account in this modeling 
exercise. (a) Firms may draw down accumu-
lated inventories sharply when faced to fore-
casts that deteriorate unexpectedly; (b) during 
crisis, protectionist policies tend to kick in; (c) RICARDO ARGUELLO C. 
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goods decline by more than services during 
downturns, and services make up the bulk of 
GDP, while goods make up the bulk of trade; 
(d) firms may tend to source relatively more 
from home country suppliers during down-
turns because of trust or financing problems. 
Furthermore, being a financial crisis, the issue 
of trade financing is important. Escaith and 
Gonguet (2009) provide an approximation to 
the analysis of the role of international supply 
chains as transmission channel of a financial 
shock. They show that when banks operate at 
the limit of their institutional capacity, and if 
assets are priced to market, then a resonance 
effect amplifies the back and forth transmission 
between real and monetary circuits, sharply 
lowering trade flows.
Even though this type of models seem 
to underestimate trade flows changes, not 
only because of the above but also due to the 
constant returns to scale specification, they 
tend to yield more precise estimates for GDP 
changes. The main reason is that big changes 
at the sectoral level translate into relatively 
small changes in the aggregated economy. 
In other words, it takes dramatic and key 
changes at the sectoral level (including trade) 
to generate sizeable changes at the aggregate 
level. For instance, it takes a 4 per cent reduc-
tion in the US’ capital stock (a truly big shock 
in a key variable) to get a decrease of 2.6 per 
cent in GDP. Therefore, at least for a case like 
the one that is of interest here, estimates for 
the change in GDP should be deemed more 
dependable (and significant) than, say, changes 
in trade flows.
With the above in mind, estimated 
changes in GDP for the set of countries under 
study indicate that the value of GDP for all 
countries under all scenarios considered dimin-
ishes. The highest average (across countries) 
decreases are attained under the base scenario, 
followed by the fixed investment scenario, 
and lastly by the fixed trade balance scenario 
(1.5, 1.4, and 1.2 per cent, respectively). The 
decomposition of value changes among price 
and quantity changes shows that price changes 
dominate. In effect, in all cases the price index 
decreases and its absolute value is higher than 
the change in the quantity index. Although, in 
general, changes in quantity tend to be nega-
tive, there are cases in which the volume of 
GDP increases. This is so most frequently 
under the fixed trade balance scenario as 
well as for some countries (Chile and Peru in 
particular).
The countries with the lowest negative 
impacts are Brasil, Chile and Peru, while those 
most affected are Venezuela and Ecuador. 
However, there is no necessary correspondence 
between trade and GDP changes. With respect 
to exports, the least affected countries are 
Argentina, Brasil, and Mexico and the most 
affected are Venezuela and Ecuador. Regard-
ing changes in imports, the countries less 
impacted are Argentina, Mexico, and Chile 
and the most impacted are Venezuela, Ecuador, 
and Colombia.
This happens as the effects do not neces-
sarily depend on the economies’ degree of trade 
dependence with respect to the US and EU’s 
economies. Trade composition, in terms of the 
export and import sectoral portfolio, also mat-
ters. The same is true as it refers to worldwide 
price changes. Even though the impact on the 
value of trade flows (exports and imports) may 
look moderate, the drop in the value of GDP is 
larger and not negligible. In spite of this, when LATIN AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE TRADE CHANNEL
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the impact is measured in terms of welfare it 
turns out that it is quite low (a consequence of 
lower world and domestic prices).
This research provides estimates on the 
direction and magnitude of the likely impacts 
of the crisis, transmitted through what could be 
called a pure trade channel, on key macro vari-
ables for the set of Latin American economies 
under study. Besides this, it highlights some 
issues frequently overlooked when attempting 
to assess them: the general equilibrium effects 
arising from trade composition and worldwide 
terms of trade changes.
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Appendix
Table A.1 Sector Aggregation in the Model
Table A.2 Regional Aggregation in the ModelRICARDO ARGUELLO C. 
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Table A.3. Confidence Intervals (94 per cent) for the Main Impacts arising from the Crisis on Latin 
American Economies. Base Scenario.
Source: author’s simulationsLATIN AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE TRADE CHANNEL
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Table A.4. Confidence Intervals (94 per cent) for the Main Impacts arising from the Crisis on Latin 
American Economies. Fixed Investment Scenario.
Source: author’s simulationsRICARDO ARGUELLO C. 
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Table A.5. Confidence Intervals (94 per cent) for the Main Impacts arising from the Crisis on Latin 
American Economies. Fixed Trade Balance Scenario.
Source: author’s simulations